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Abstract: This paper describes the process of implementing
a complex communications protocol that provides reliable
delivery of data in multicast-capable, packet-switching
telecommunication networks. The protocol, called the
Reliable Multicasting Protocol (RMP), was developed
incrementally using a combination of formal and informal
techniques in an attempt to ensure the correctness of its
implementation. Our development process involved three
concurrent activities: (1) the initial construction and
incremental enhancement of a formal state model of the
protocol machine; (2) the initial coding and incremental •
enhancement of the implementation; and (3) model-based
testing of iterative implementations of the protocol. These '
activities were carried out by two separate teams: a design '
team and a V&V team. The design team built the first
version of RMP with limited functionality to handle only
nominal requirements of data delivery. In a series of
iterative steps, the design team added new functionality to ,'
the implementation while the V&V team kept the state
model in fidelity with the implementation. This was done
by generating test cases based on suspected errant or off- ,
nominal behaviors predicted by the current model. If the
execution of a test was different between the model and '
implementation, then the differences helped identify
inconsistencies between the model and implementation. The
dialogue between both teams drove the co-evolution of the
model and implementation. Testing served as the vehicle
for keeping the model and implementation in fidelity with -
each other. This paper describes (1) our experiences in
developing our process model; and (2) three example
problems found during the development of RMP. _~---
This work is supported by NASA Cooperative Agreement
NCCW-0040 under supervision of the NASA Independent
Software Verification and Validation (IV&.V) Facility, Fairmont,
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Much work has been done in the area of verifying that
implementations of communication protocols conform to their
specifications [1,2]. Conformance is usually verified through
extensive testing of an implementation in which tests are
derived directly from the protocol specification. If an
implementation behaves in a manner predicted by the
protocol specification, then the implementation is said to
conform to the specification. If not, then an error exists in
the implementation of the protocol. Although this method
does not formally verify that a protocol specification and an
implementation are consistent, it represents the state-of-the-
practice in this domain of software development.
This paper describes our experiences while trying to
formally specify and implement a complex communications
protocol that provides reliable delivery of data in multicast-
capable, packet- switching telecommunications networks. The
protocol specification, called the Reliable Multicasting
Protocol (RMP), was developed concurrently with its
implementation. The implementation was developed
incrementally using a combination of formal and informal
techniques in an attempt to ensure the correctness of its
implementation with respect to the evolving protocol
specification. We found that many formal methods did not
help us in the development of the protocol specification nor its
implementation. We concluded that the best uses for formal
methods in our situation was in the specification of the
protocol requirements and the generation of tests derived
from the specifications applied to prototype versions of the
software during development.
One of the primary goals of our effort was to achieve
high-fidelity between the specification and implementation
during development. High-fidelity means that the protocol
specification and an implementation of protocol agree regarding
the behavior of the protocol. The agreement is based on
equivalence of state transitions taken in the specification and
implemented in code. We felt that if fidelity was not a
primary concern, then there existed the strong possibility
that the specification and the implementation would diverge
in behavior. This would render analysis of any formal
specification model irrelevant in the development and
maintenance of the software since such analysis would offer
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Figure 1: An example of an RMP token ring and events
little assurance that the actual code behaved in an identical
manner.
Our development process involved two teams: a design
team and a verification and validation (V&V) team. These
two teams worked in an iterative, interactive fashion that
allowed the design team to focus on nominal behaviors of
the software while the V&V team examined off-nominal
behaviors. Off-nominal behaviors include event sequences with
non-ideal conditions such as site losses and network partitions.
The task of the design team was (1) to specify the protocol in
terms of mode tables and (2) implement the protocol in C++
as specified by the mode tables. The task of the V&V
team was to (1) analyze the consistency and completeness
of the mode tables by analyzing "paths" through the mode
tables and (2) generate tests from the mode tables for
suspect conditions. Suspect conditions include those paths
identified in the mode table model as being deadlock,
livelock, or potential sources of unexpected behaviors. The
V&V team used the requirements mode model to identify
cases that were considered by the design team to be
unusual or virtually impossible. In retrospect, these cases
were the source of several errors in the specification and
implementation of RMP.
We use the terms "verification and validation" in a
different context from their typical usage because of our
bipartite, prototyping development process. In our case, the
term "verification" 1 refers to activities that help in the
identification of off-nominal behaviors of the software based
on analysis of the specification model. We use the term
"validation" to refer to activities that involve testing the
implementation for properties based on potential problems
revealed through verification analysis such as livelock, deadlock,
and violations of invariant conditions.
The protocol specification as expressed in the mode tables
helped us organize and structure tests while developing
implementation prototypes. Testing formed the dialogue by
which the two teams communicated about the intended
behavior of the protocol and its implementation. This paper
relates our experiences in developing our approach and
describes details of our model-based testing methods. We
do not claim to have "formally verified and validated" the
RMP specification and its implementation, but rather we
have developed a strategy and process by which the
evolution of RMP is enhanced by testing and verification.
Our approach has been to study the problems that have
occurred during development, testing, and operation of RMP.
Through a post-mortem analysis of problems, we are trying
to find methods that may have discovered problems earlier
in the development lifecycle.
2.0 THE RELIABLE MULTICASTING PROTOCOL (RMP)
The Reliable Multicasting Protocol (RMP) [3] is based on
an algorithm originally developed for reliable delivery of
data in broadcast-capable, packet-switching networks [4].
The original algorithm, which we call the Token Ring
Protocol (TRP), allows sites in a packet-switching network
to establish a token ring for distributing responsibility for
acknowledgments. A single token is passed from site to site
around the ring and only the holder of the token (called
the current token site) can acknowledge certain data packets.
RMP has high-performance characteristics because
acknowledgments themselves are multicast to all other token
ring sites. When a site gets the token (i.e., it becomes the
current token site), it multicasts an acknowledgment if and
only if it has seen all data packets since the last
acknowledgment it received. The token is passed in the
multicast acknowledgment packet. The acknowledgment
packet includes the source and sequence numbers of data packets
it is acknowledging. This allows each site to detect if any
packets are missing. A site will use negative acknowledgments
to request retransmission of any missing packets. When all
packets since the last acknowledgment received have been
received by the current token site, then that site can
multicast its acknowledgment and thus pass the token to the
next site on the ring. When a token site sends an
acknowledgment, it is assumed that all data packets since it last
held the token have been received by all sites.
Packet
Ack
Data
Data
Timestamp
1
2
3
Token Pass and Data
B-»A
(A.1)
missing
Number of Packets
Table 1: Ordering Queue for Site C with an empty slot
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Table 2: Final Ordering Queue for Site C
The sender of a packet assumes that all messages since it last
had the token have been received by the other sites within
a requested quality of service (QoS) level. A packet is
marked delivered if and only if it satisfies its QoS level of
delivery. The QoS level allows for resilience of the
protocol in the presence of site failures and network
partitions. In the case of failures, the token ring reforms
itself around the failed site. In the presence of persistent
failures, the application program using RMP must decide to
degrade the QoS level or try again.
RMP differs from previous reliable broadcast protocols like
TRP in that an acknowledgment packet may acknowledge an
arbitrary number of data packets. Previous protocols
specified that each data and acknowledgment packets have a
one-to-one relationship. This dramatically improves
throughput in networks with sporadic losses and allows an
application to tradeoff performance and quality of service
requirements.
Each site in a token ring maintains a data structure called
an Ordering Queue (OrderingQ) in which acknowledgments
and data packets are organized based on timestamps. An
Ordering Queue is consistent if and only if there are no
missing data packets for pending acknowledgments. A
missing packet will appear as an empty slot in the
OrderingQ that must be filled. When a site becomes the
token site, all empty slots in the OrderingQ since the last
acknowledgment received must be filled. For example, in
Figure 1 we show 3 sites of a token ring and a global
sequence of events. No site has complete knowledge of this
sequence. It is only shown to illustrate a possible scenario.
Next to each site is a list of the messages sent by that
site. First, site A sends a data packet signified as
Data(A,l) where the first parameter is the sending site and
the second is the sequence number of the message. Sequence
numbers are unique to individual sites. Second, site B
sends a data packet (Data(B,l)). The initial token site is
site B who then acknowledges both data packets and passes
the token to site A. The Ack((A,l),(B,l),A,l) message
contains a list of source identifiers and sequence numbers
for two packets, followed by the next token site and the
timestamp of the acknowledgment. We assume that site C
missed the data packet Data(B.l). Table 1 shows a
snapshot of the OrderingQ data structure at site C after it
receives the Ack((A,l),(B,l),A,l) message. Upon receiving
this acknowledgment, site C realizes it has missed the
Data(B.l) message that should fill the third slot of the
OrderingQ. It knows this because the Data(B,l) packet is
listed in the Ack message from B. Each slot in an
OrderingQ corresponds to a timestamp whether explicit in
the case of Ack messages or implicit in the case of Data
packets. Site C will multicast a Nack message to request the
data packet to fill the one slot in its OrderingQ at timestamp 3.
Current Mode
NotTokenSite
NotTokenSite
NotTokenSite
Getting
TokenSite
Event/Alarm
Ack
Ack
Ack
Data
Pass Alarm
Condition
OrderingQ consistent
and this site named new
token site
This site not named
new token site (other
site named)
OrderingQ inconsistent
and this site not named
new token site
OrderingQ consistent
OrderingQ consistent
New Mode
TokenSite
NotTokenSite
Getting
TokenSite
Passing
Action
-
-
Send Nack for missing
packets
-
Send Null Ack
Table 3: A fragment of RMP specification mode tables
After a period during which no data packets are
transmitted, Site A will time-out and subsequently send a
multicast NULL Ack packet with timestamp 4. This passed
the token to site C. Site B responds to the Nack by
retransmitting the Data(B,l) message. The sequence number
identifies this message uniquely to distinguish it from new
messages. After the retransmission of Data(B,l), site A
multicasts another data packet with sequence number 2 as
Data(A,2). Since site C's OrderingQ is consistent, it
multicasts an acknowledgment of the Data(A,2) packet and
passes the token to site B. Table 2 shows the final configuration
of site C's OrderingQ.
3.0 VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF RMP
A formal proof of correctness for the original protocol
specification exists [5], but we also wanted to ensure a high
degree of fidelity between the specification and
implementation of the protocol. To achieve this fidelity, we
adopted a mode-based, tabular approach based on a variant
of SCR- based tables [6] to express the protocol
specification instead of the axiomatic approach in the
original proof. Table 3 shows a small portion of the
protocol specification tables for RMP. The first column
shows the current mode. A mode is a superstate that
encapsulates a larger set of specific states of an
implementation [7]. While an implementation may change
specific variables and thus move from state to state, the
mode may remain unchanged until a major event and
condition occur. Modes allow the specification to view
states of the protocol machine at an appropriate level of
abstraction for our analysis. Mode names in Table 3
include TokenSite (the site holds the token), NotTokenSite
(the site does not hold the token), and Getting (the site
holds the token, but must retrieve missing packets). The
second column specifies the event which includes the arrival
of a packet (data or acknowledgment (ACK)) or a time-out
alarm. The third column specifies the condition under
which a mode transition will occur given the event. In
Table 3, we show conditions including checks for
consistency of the Ordering Queue and checks to see if an
incoming acknowledgment packet names this site as the
new token site. We considered using condition tables [8]
but our approach is currently sufficient for our protocol
specification. The fourth column specifies the new mode if
the event and condition are true. Finally, the fifth column
specifies the action that takes place upon the mode
transition. An action includes variable settings, conditions,
and output events.
We used model checking to explore potential problems in
the requirements mode model and used testing to explore
suspect cases in the implementation. These tests helped
verify that the implementation had the same behavior as the
specification in specific cases. We tried several different
specification methods for RMP including PVS [9], Murphi
[10], SMV [11], and SPIN [12]. We settled on a modified
version of Murphi since (1) it was amenable to our tabular
specifications and (2) includes temporal logic operators for
verification of liveness, deadlock, and invariant properties of
the specification. Tests were generated by hand from
suspect cases and added to the test suite based on analysis of
the Murphi models of the RMP specifications.
This type of approach to analysis played a major role in
our effort even though we hoped that formal methods would
reduce the need for testing. We discovered, however, that
testing did not help us verify the protocol after its
completion but rather it helped us to discover problems
during the concurrent specification and implementation. We
built a test scaffold for RMP by creating a low-level
network stub and used testing as the vehicle for keeping
our evolving implementation and specification in fidelity
with each other. The code was annotated with debugging
statements that produced a trace of events and conditions.
Such traces were compared against the specification tables
to validate the behavior of the implementation relative to
the formal model. This approach proved to be very useful
since the formal model helped us organize our test suite
and provided an abstract model we could analyze.
We built the protocol specification and its implementation
concurrently because pragmatic constraints of implementing
the protocol had a feedback effect on the protocol
specification. Performance requirements, programming
language peculiarities, and other pragmatic aspects of the
implementation forced us to consider changes to the
requirements during implementation. We adopted an
iterative approach to development because we expected
these types of problems to occur. The design team built the
first version of RMP with limited functionality to handle
only nominal requirements of data delivery. This initial
version did not handle off-nominal cases such as network
partitions or site failures. Meanwhile, the V&V team
concurrently developed the Murphi model of the
requirements using the existing mode tables. Based on
these requirements tables, the V&V team developed test
cases to exercise the implementation. In a series of
iterative steps, the design team added new functionality to
the implementation while the V&V team kept the Murphi
state model in fidelity with the implementation. This was done
by generating test cases based on suspected errant or off-
nominal behaviors predicted by the current model. If the
execution of a test in the model and implementation
agreed, then the test either found a potential problem or
verified a required behavior. However, if the execution of
a test was different in the model and implementation, then
the differences helped identify inconsistencies between the
model and implementation. In either case, the dialogue between
both teams drove the co-evolution of the model and
implementation.
Based on the RMP requirement tables, we constructed a formal
model of RMP using different model checkers to explore
potential problems in the specification. We tried several different
specification methods for RMP including PVS, SMV, Murphi,
and SPIN. After trying all these tools and comparing their
performances, we finally settled on Murphi and SPIN. Both of
them have the following desired properties:
• Both are automatic model checkers and the RMP
specifications can be easily transferred to the tool-specific
specification language, i.e. PROMELA for SPIN,
• Both of them support high-level language features, such as
user-defined data type, procedures, structures, and
• Both are designed for the verification of asynchronous
concurrent systems, including detecting the absence of
deadlock, unexecutable code, incomplete specification, non-
progressive loops and the validation of system invariants.
To construct a formal model with high fidelity to the
specifications requires a suitable level of abstraction. If the
model is too abstract, the model checker may not be able to
supply useful information. On the other hand, if the model is too
detailed, the model checker may not be able to handle the state-
explosion problem and the large memory requirement. It is
important to make this decision on the right level of abstraction
so that the protocol specification can be fully described by the
model checker and the formal model can supply useful feedback
to the protocol design.
Due to the complexity of the protocol and the limitations of the
existed tools, we adopted a two-step method. First, a high-level
single-site state-machine transition model was constructed using
Murphi. Murphi is specifically designed for the .high-level finite-
state concurrent systems, and it supports the verification of
liveness specifications written in linear temporal logic (LTL) and
the specification of fairness properties. This high-level model
served to check the completeness of the specification of state
transitions as well as some invariants conditions. After
specifying fairness properties on events, we are confident that the
protocol does preserve the required properties if the fairness
properties hold. These properties are crucial to the services that
RMP attempts to provide. For example, properties relating to
passing the token and eventually getting the token are inherently
crucial for RMP to meet its requirements of ordered, atomic
delivery of data.
Secondly, we constructed a lower-level, multiple-site interactive
model using SPIN. Even though the current version of SPIN
supports linear temporal logic specifications, it is better utilized
as a tool for validating data communication protocols through
simulation. Consequently, it has explicit support for processes
communications, i.e. asynchronous message channels and
synchronization by rendezvous. At this lower-level model, we
were more interested in the mutual-interactions between
different site members in order to verify that the protocol
specifications are correct to the extent that they guarantee the
reliable delivery of data packets among token ring members.
Combining the SPIN and Murphi models, we made significant
progress in verifying the state-transitions as the result of site
event-response and the interaction between sites.
The model checkers have been used in two ways: checking
deadlock and checking invariants. By default, checks for
deadlock conditions are performed by an exhaustive search of all
possible state transitions. This is used to determine the
completeness and consistency of the specification. The system
invariants and state-assertions are used to verify the required
properties of the protocol. During the initial development of the
formal model, deadlock or failed assertions are almost
unavoidable due to overly pessimistic analysis of the state space
and the lack of appropriate fairness conditions. Through
interactions with the protocol designers and the iterative
improvement of the formal model, those deadlock conditions and
failed assertions were elided with appropriate changes and
fairness conditions added (e.g., that the network will eventually
deliver a message). Consequently the specification and the
formal model were refined in the process. After the model has
been established in the deadlock-free state, more modifications
and fine-tuning were required to put system-wide and state-
specific invariants into the model. In this way, we successfully
identified some incomplete specification and design flaws. Some
examples of problems found using this approach are discussed in
section 4.
While maintenance of the formal model through testing the
evolving implementation took considerable effort, it also
required work to develop a testing framework. This framework
was designed to be able to simulate any path through the
specifications and show that the implementation exhibits a
specific sequence of events and state transitions. In the
implementation, the actual components that are responsible for
protocol operation (i.e., the OrderingQ, DataQ, and event
handling routines) were implemented with an interface that
provides a generic way of handling any event specified in the
specifications. With this interface in place, the development of
the testing framework was facilitated. In addition, a scripting
language was developed based on the event interface that
allowed every aspect of the implementation's state to be
examined between events. These included the ability to examine
RMP data structures, such as the OrderingQ, the ability to force
specific conditions to be true or false based solely on the event
type and event data, and the ability to control the order and
frequency at which events are processed. In contrast to the year
of development and 22,000+ lines of C++ code for the RMP
implementation, the scripting code was developed in three days
and consists of about 1,200 lines of yacc, lex, and C++ code.
Much of the scripting code was enhanced as needs arose to
examine the state of the test relative to the formal model. Our
approach proved to be a valuable development tool as well as an
indispensable testing and verification tool during development.
The scripting framework developed for RMP has general purpose
applications because the same methodology can be applied to
other implementations of event-based systems. Event-based
mechanisms are becoming increasingly popular programming
approaches for many developers. For example, many window-
oriented operating systems require programming in an event-
based paradigm. Such systems allow programmers to design
systems that respond specifically to certain input conditions and
events. However, event-based systems have several problems.
First, event-based systems must carry large amounts of state
around between events. This makes it difficult to express event-
based systems using functional specifications because the entire
state must be passed as an argument to each function.
The need to examine the state of objects and ask "what if
questions of the RMP implementation has proven to be one of
the most valuable features of the testing framework used by both
RMP development teams. The framework allows questions to be
asked that would be difficult to duplicate in actual application
execution. Any formal model can address only limited levels of
detail to avoid state explosion problems, but the scripting
framework can continue to ask questions at relatively detailed
levels. For example, the V&V team often developed "what if
questions based on intuition and tested the implementation for
conformity to their expectations. Subsequently, the test results
were compared to the formal model for conformity to the
specifications. This approach complemented the analysis of the
formal model and further helped refine the specifications.
The scripting language made test management simpler by
automating test generation and organizing the execution of
regression tests. The ability to make assertions on the state of
data structures allowed scripts to be developed that contained
key assertions checked during test execution. If a script passed
all the assertions, then the test passed. This provided an efficient
means of detecting problems but it also gave convenient clues as
to the source of errors. The scripting framework also helped as a
configuration management tool. The set of scripts used for
regression testing became larger over time. In an effort to control
this expansion, scripts were given versions to show the relevance
that a particular sequence of events had on the current model.
Some scripts were outdated as the specifications changed to meet
problems. Typically, these scripts would fail as they no longer
were valid with the current specifications. These scripts were
then updated to meet the new specifications. Other configuration
management issues have also been applied to the scripting
framework, such as date/time stamps on scripts to examine the
effects of changes. The scripting framework also had a reverse
effect into the implementation development as assertions were
placed directly into the code to check for dangerous conditions
during actual operation. The placement of these assertions was
dependent on problems previously encountered in scripts. In this
way, the scripting framework has acted as a catalyst to spark
development into thinking, about possibly errant conditions in the
design.
To this point, testing of RMP has consisted of deriving tests from
the requirements state machine. This entails the creation of test
scripts that define paths through the state machine.
Traditionally, testing along these paths is used to increase
C9nfidence that the implementations meets the specifications.
We felt, however, that this process best serves to help refine the
requirements themselves. The scripts derived from these
requirements are executed in the scripting framework on the
evolving implementation.
One major problem has been determining which paths constitute
an adequate test suite. Initially, we created paths starting at an
initial state and continuing until the path had reached a state that
had been previously visited. These paths only focused on the
gross state transitions of the protocol engine rather than changes
to specific variables. These test paths form a test tree with the
initial state at the root.
We used the method described above primarily to examine the
reformation aspects of RMP. Reformation is the process by
which an RMP token ring adapts to network partitions and site
failures. We began our testing on reformation aspects of RMP
because we were still developing the reformation specifications
of the protocol. We felt that testing would give us the insight
necessary to refine the requirements and the implementation
concurrently. This method served its purpose and we were able
to find many problems. Again, a few of these will be described
in the next section.
However, this method of test suite generation was unacceptable
for the remainder of the RMP specification. Since RMP has such
a large state space, 12 states, and a large number of events, 15,
we decided that the test suite would contain more than 80,000
separate test paths even when limited to gross state transitions.
The state explosion problem forced us to look for another
approach. We needed a method that would be powerful enough
to find errors, but have a relatively small test suite.
The W methods [1] of test suite generation is a powerful
technique for finding operational and transitional errors. The
partial W method has the same power and generates fewer test
paths in the suite. However, we did not used these methods for
two reasons. First, the methods only characterize a state machine
by its inputs and outputs. The methods assume that the state of
the machine cannot be known at any time. In our case, however,
the scripting framework does allow the tester to examine the
state between events. Furthermore, the W methods work well
only for a restricted set of state machines. This includes small
state machines with no global variables. RMP was too large and
depends on the state of the Ordering Queue as a global variable.
If our RMP model was restricted within these limits, we felt that
the new state machine would no longer be representative of the
implementation. We were able to restrict exploration of paths
based on a transition cover of the state machine. A transition
cover consists of examining each state's behavior to all possible
events regardless of whether or not an event causes a transition
or not. The cover starts at the initial state and continues until all
states have been explored. Verifying the completeness of the
implementation in this manner has given us confidence that each
state behaves as the specifications require. In addition, the
number of tests needed for the cover was less than 200, which
was not an unreasonable amount.
4.0 LESSONS LEARNED
Most of the problems found in the RMP specifications and
implementation were caused by incomplete requirements
where it was assumed that certain conditions could not
occur but actually did occur in practice. Sometimes, the
implementation was coded before the specification was
updated if a pragmatic consideration made such a change
expedient in the code. Other times, we explored solutions
in the tables before coding it. We believe that testing
between the specification and implementation during
incremental development helped reveal these problems much
earlier than if traditional testing had been done after full
development.
4.1 The Perpetual Getting Problem
As shown in Table 3, a site will transition from
NotTokenSite mode to TokenSite mode if the OrderingQ is
consistent. If the OrderingQ is not consistent, then the site
will enter the Getting mode while retrieving missing
packets. Once the OrderingQ is consistent, the site will
transition from Getting mode to the TokenSite mode. This
fact was correctly specified in our mode tables, but the
implementation was incorrect because a portion of code for
the Getting mode did not check for consistency of the
OrderingQ. The implementation livelocked in the Getting mode
in the case of missing packets.
We were able to discover the problem during analysis for
livelock modes using temporal assertions. A pessimistic
analysis yielded potential off-nominal paths in the
specification. Under ideal operating conditions of the
protocol, no site should have to enter the Getting mode
since no loss occurs under ideal conditions. Indeed, the
problem was not discovered in testing on a Local Area
Network where there was no loss of packets unless the
network was congested (a rare condition). Subsequently, no
sites ever entered the Getting mode to retrieve missing
packets. The mode specifications do not explicitly model
the loss of a packet, rather the condition of an inconsistent
OrderingQ is an off-nominal behavior when a site becomes
the token site. We constructed a test case for this scenario and
found the problem in the implementation.
4.2 The Time-To-Live Problem
RMP relies on an unreliable IP Multicasting layer [13] in
which packets have a time-to-live (TTL) field that controls
their propagation in Wide Area Networks. At each router,
the TTL field of a packet is decremented by 1 and checked
to see if it is above or below the router threshold. If the
TTL is above the threshold, the router forwards the
multicast packet. If not, the packet is not forwarded. This
allows control of the propagation of multicast packets to
local, national, and world-wide distribution.
RMP extends the original TRP work by allowing for the
initial formation and subsequent modifications to the token
ring membership list during execution. RMP allows sites to
join and leave the token ring dynamically. Our
implementation, however, overlooked the fact that token
rings sites can be local to one another (i.e., at low TTL
values), but new sites can be very far 6 away (i.e., at high
TTL values). When the far site tries to join a ring, the
far site will not see any messages due to their low TTL
values. Subsequently, when the ring fails to pass the token
to the far site. This failure will trigger a reformation of the
ring to exclude the far site. This situation can repeat itself
ad infinitum as long as the far site keeps trying to join the ring.
Time-to-live information was not included in the mode
specifications. Therefore, no analysis of the formal model
could have revealed this problem and we could not
construct a test for this condition from the model. We feel,
however, that this problem could have been detected during
implementation when the design team needed to fill in the
TTL field of the packets. The designers should have noted
that the requirements are silent on how to fill-in the TTL
field of any packet constructed. This silence invites a
designer to make inconsistent assumptions about the
behavior of the protocol machine.
4.3 The Leaving Ring Timestamp Problem
When a token site tries to leave a ring in a controlled
fashion (i.e., rather than an abrupt site failure), it must
wait until the token completes a cycle of the remaining
ring sites before actually leaving the ring. The reason for
this restriction is due to the fact that the departing site
may hold packets that are missing at other sites. If the departing
site leaves too soon, then some empty slots in the Ordering
Queues of other sites cannot be filled.
The specifications incorrectly stated that a site may leave the
ring when it has seen N timestamped packets where N is
the number of site remaining on the token ring. The
problem with this approach is that any intervening data
packet can fill a timestamp slot causing the departing site
to exit the ring before all remaining sites have
acknowledged. We incorrectly assumed a one-to-one
relationship between timestamps and acknowledgment
packets. As a result, the ring is wedged in a livelock state
because sites cannot fill some empty slots in their Ordering
Queues.
The problem was found through direct analysis of the
formal model and testing revealed the problem in the
implementation. It took unusual conditions, however, to
reproduce this problem in practice because the network had
to be congested before the behavior appeared. The formal
model produced a suspect path and the corresponding test
produced a livelock condition. We feel that this problem
was easily revealed by analysis of the formal model. In
addition, the formal model helped structure exploration of test
conditions during the resolution of the problem after its
initial discovery.
5.0 CONCLUSIONS
We do not claim that RMP has been "verified and validated"
to the extent that it is totally correct, rather that we have
developed a technique that strengthens analysis and testing
in the long-term development of our software. Short term
problems did occur, but they helped us to evolve a
specification model in high-fidelity with an implementation.
Co-evolution of the formal specification model and the
implementation was the most useful result of our study. Our
technique allowed our two teams to structure their tests and
other analysis activities. Their activities supported each
other in the development of the implementation and
refinement of the specifications.
In the future, we will continue to use RMP as a testbed
problem and explore new specification and analysis
techniques that complement incremental software
development activities. We are continuing to evolve the
specifications even though the software has been released in
a Beta test version. This type of release scheme limits the
use of RMP to non-critical projects and helps us explore
operational problems. When a problem in operation does
occur, we are using the mode tables to trace where the
problem occurred. This has been useful in understanding
problems, finding why problems were or were not detected
earlier, and refining the specification incrementally.
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